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Pe rce ptio n s  o f No n -Accide n tal Ch ild De aths  as  Pre ve n table  Eve n ts : 
The  im pact o f pro bability he uris tics  an d biase s   
o n  ch ild  pro te ctio n  w o rk 
 
Abs tract 
Anxiety about the possibility of non-accidental deaths of children has had a 
major influence on child care policy and practice over the last 40  years. The 
formal inquiry reports and media coverage of these rare events  serve to 
maintain the perception that these are regular incidents that happen far too 
often and that they could have been prevented. This focus on individual events 
tends to distort a clear view of the actual probability of non-accidental deaths 
and serves to reinforce the notion that potentially all child care cases are risky 
and that any social work practitioner could be involved in such a case. As a 
result, work with children has become highly risk averse. However, in 
statistical terms, the probability of non-accidental child deaths is very low and 
recently has averaged about 55 deaths a year. Children are at considerably 
higher risk of being killed on the roads. 
This paper examines the way in which perceptions of the ‘high’ level of risk of 
possible child deaths are maintained despite the very low statistical 
probability of such incidents. It draws on thinking from behavioural 
psychology and, in particular the work of Kahneman and Tversky, to consider 
some of the biases in probability reasoning affecting people’s perception of 
risk and explores how inquiry reports into single past events reconfirm risk 
perceptions. It is suggested that recognition of the essentially unpredictable 
nature of future non-accidental child deaths would free up childcare 
professionals to work in a more positive and less r isk-averse manner in the 
present. 
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In tro ductio n  
In December 1985 the report into the death of J asmine Beckford concluded, 
‘On any conceivable version of events under inquiry the death of J asmine 
Beckford was both a predictable and preventable hom icide......’ (London 
Borough of Brent, 1985, p.287). In other words, by acting or not acting as they 
should have, not only were particular people (i.e. professionals) to blame for 
her death, but it was not possible to even im agine any circumstances in  which 
the ways the professionals behaved could possibly have made sense.  The 
report then proposed many recommendations for restr ucturing and 
improving social work practice. 
Twenty five years later in  2010, a serious case review in Salford into the 
murder of a 12-year old schoolgirl, Tia Rigg, said ‘In these circumstances the 
death of Child H (Tia Rigg) was not predictable or preventable....’ (Salford 
Safeguarding Children Board, 21010, para. 3.19, emphasis added). However, it 
then went on to propose a long list of recommendations as to how practice 
should change amongst social work and health professionals.  
Although these two incidents may be quite different in the details of the events 
that took place, the outcome in both cases was the same: a child died non-
accidentally and both led to formal reports. However, what is striking looking 
at the reports are the different approaches each takes to probabilistic 
reasoning.  In the J asmine Beckford report, the death of the child is presented 
as highly probable and it says that those working with the case should have 
anticipated such an outcome. On the other hand, the Tia Rigg report 
concludes that the child’s death was highly improbable and could not have 
been foreseen by those involved. However, despite these different views of the 
probability of the particular children ’s deaths, there is still no change in  the 
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apportioning of blame as, in both reports, the view is that professionals were 
at fault in some way, and so must change their practice. As Lupton says, 
drawing on Mary Douglas’s (1992) perspective on risk, ‘...every death, every 
accident and every misfortune must be “chargeable to someone’s account” – 
someone must be found to blame’ (Lupton, 1999, p.45). 
Bearing in mind these paradoxical approaches to risk in  social work, this 
article examines how probability is viewed and understood in  work with 
children, particularly in relation to child protect ion and non-accidental child 
deaths, and how this affects the way social work practit ioners are able to 
respond to and make sense of risk in their every day practice. 
The paper is divided into two parts. Drawing on available statistical 
information, the first part considers the actual probability of non-accidental 
child deaths occurring on a yearly basis. It also looks at the figures in relation 
to cases of child deaths where the child has, or has had, some contact with 
social care services and the implications this has for social work practice and 
the management of risk. One of the key factors analysed here is the impact of 
very low base rates, i.e. the actual number of non -accidental child deaths in  
relation to the child population under consideration ,  and the effect this has on 
the feasibility of risk prediction. The second part of the paper  examines some 
ideas developed by the behavioural psychologists, Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman et al., 1982; 
Kahneman, 2011), concerning the limitations people often experience in  
relation to accurate probabilistic reasoning, and then applies them to social 
work understandings of the probability of non -accidental child deaths. Their 
work, and that of others in the field, has been highly influential in such 
disciplines as psychology, economics and business and their ideas have 
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reached a wider audience through a range of texts (Bernstein, 1996; Taleb, 
2005; Lanchester, 2010) but they have received only limited attention in 
social work (Stalker, 2003).  
A key aspect of Kaheman and Tversky’s work was an exploration of how 
judgments are made under conditions of uncertainty (Kahneman et al., 1982), 
which is, of course, a constant issue for all those working in the field of child 
protection. They identified a range of the heuristics, or ‘rules of thumb’, that 
people use to help them make decisions and the range of biases that can affect 
their decision-making processes. Some of the aspects of decision making they 
looked at were ‘loss aversion’, where people would rather avoid a negative (or 
loss) rather than achieve a positive; and heuristics such as 
‘representativeness’, where a individual case is seen as representing a 
particular category and ‘availability’, when people assess the probability of an 
event by the ease with which examples can be brought to mind.  Consideration  
is given to how these heuristics operate in assessing risk in child protection 
and the effects they have on judging the probability of particular outcomes. 
This section of the paper particularly draws on what is known as the 
‘hindsight’ bias (Frischoff, 1982), where people, who have knowledge of the 
actual outcome (usually negative) of a situation, claim they know how those 
involved in the situation should have acted to prevent that outcome. This is a 
common feature of many inquiry reports into child death s. The view that it is 
possible to ‘predict the past’, i.e. to argue retrospectively (as many Inquiry 
Reports do) that the professionals involved should have known that their 
actions or non-action would lead to a negative outcome, helps to maintain the 
perception both that non-accidental child deaths have a high probability and 
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that most could be avoided, if not eliminated entirely, by professional 
interventions.  
 
W hat is  the  pro bability o f n o n -accide n tal ch ild  de aths? 
As with any such controversial topic, to come up with a definitive figure for 
the number of non-accidental child deaths is not a simple one. Firstly, there is 
the issue of definition - w hat constitutes a non-accidental child death? The 
word 'non-accidental' is being used here in a descriptive sense to cover child 
deaths that are not due to illness and other medical conditions or major 
traumatic events such as car accidents or falls. However, this still leaves a 
wide range of incidents that can be classified as non-accidental and can 
include such diverse causes of death as the fatal abuse and neglect of a two-
year old over an extended period; a spouse, unwilling to accept the end of a 
relationship, killing their partner and children; a  mother with a severely 
disabled child, unable to cope any more, jumping with her daughter to their 
death or a depressed teenager taking their own life. Sidebotham (2007) has 
attempted to categorise child deaths into different  groups, which include 
infanticide/ ’covert’ homicide, severe physical assaults, extreme neglect , 
deliberate homicides and deaths related to maltreatment. However, there are 
also cases where the cause of death is unclear, with the result that it then 
becomes difficult to decide how the death should be classified. These are, of 
course, in risk terms, categorisation problems, which is another theme of 
these special issues (Health, Risk and Society , Vol. 14. Issue 2), but is not one 
that I wish to focus on here. For the purposes of this paper, the aim is to 
identify an approximate yearly average for the non -accidental child deaths as 
a basis for the overall discussion. 
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Over the last ten years there have been a number of reports that have 
attempted to quantify the number of deaths as a yearly average. In  2003, in 
response to claims in national newspapers that child homicides had halved in  
England and Wales since the 1970s, Creighton and Tissier (researchers with 
the NSPCC) argued that non-accidental child deaths had in fact remained 
steady and had averaged 79 deaths a year for the previous 28 years, i.e. from 
the beginning of the 1970s (Creighton and Tissier, 2003). They drew on 
figures from two governmental publications – Crim inal Statistics and the ONS 
publication Mortality  Statistics - but they acknowledged that the ways of 
recording child homicides had changed during this period.  
In 2007 another NSPCC analysis of Home Office figures  (using figures from 
Coleman et al., 2007) gave a five-year average of 67 homicides per year for 
children aged under 16 in the period 2001/ 02 to 2005/ 06 in  England and 
Wales (www.nspcc.org.uk/ Inform/ research/ statistics/ child_ homicides/ ). A 
more recent NSPCC report (nspcc.org.uk/ Inform/ research/ briefings/ ) in 
April 2011 said that the average number of child homicides (based on a 5-year 
average) was now down to 55 deaths, or approximately one death per week. 
These figures were drawn from the Home Office publication Hom icide, 
firearm  offences and intim ate violence (Smith et al., 2011) and Mortality  
Statistics (ONS). 
Similarly, the latest two-year overview analysis of Serious Case Reviews, 
which are the local reviews required by the Governm ent into the death or 
serious injury of a child where abuse and neglect are known or suspected, 
reports that there are 50 -55 non-accidental child deaths each year (Brandon et 
al., 2012). 
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While clearly each death is a tragedy and it is good news if the numbers of 
children being killed non-accidentally is falling, the statistically differences 
discussed above in relation to the overall child population (11 million children 
under 18) does not change the probability of non-accidental child deaths in a 
significant way. Therefore, for the purposes of the discussion in this paper, I 
will take the figure of an average of 55 non-accidental deaths a year as a base 
line, which allows for some discrepancies between the different statistical 
samples. On this basis, the annual probability of any particular child being 
killed non-accidentally is .0005% or 1:200 ,000 . 
 
Child de aths  an d ch ildre n ’s  so cial care  se rvice s  
While the figures discussed above relate to the probability of any specific child 
in England and Wales being killed non-accidentally, it is worth considering 
the situation with regard to children who have had some contact with or are 
known to the children’s social care services. As mentioned above, in recent 
years the Government has commissioned research reports on a two-yearly 
basis giving an overview of Serious Case Reviews, the local reports into child 
deaths and cases of serious harm, which are carried  out by Local Safeguarding 
Children Boards. The last four reports covering the period 2003-11 (each two-
year period runs from April of the first year to Mar ch of the second year) have 
all been carried out by research teams led by the same researchers (Brandon 
et al., 2008; Brandon et al., 2009; Brandon et al., 2010; Brandon et al., 2012) 
and so have been able to identify a number of similar patterns between the 
different cohorts. In  total there were just over 80 0  serious case reviews in  the 
eight-year period, which is a yearly average of 100  incidents. Again, on 
average, in two thirds of the cases the child died and in  one third they were 
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seriously injured. There was a consistent pattern of between 45-50% of the 
case reviews concerning children under one year old and approximately two 
thirds were less than five. 
However, one of the most striking features of these reviews is the status of the 
children, both those who died and those who were seriously injured, in 
relation to children’s social care services. While in  both groups approximately 
55% of the families were known in some general way to children’s social care 
(e.g. contact with an agency about an unrelated issues or about a different 
family member) the percentage where the child who died or was injured had a 
specific involvement with social work services, i.e. was formally registered as 
'at risk' either on the child protection register or as subject to a child 
protection plan, was much smaller. This averages ou t across the four cohorts 
studied as 13% of the total cases, which is equivalent to about 104 cases over 
the eight-year period. If, in actuarial terms, this number is  regarded as having 
the same balance of two thirds child deaths to one third serious injury as the 
overall total of cases, then on a annual basis, there would be approximately 13 
cases which were formally registered as at risk, with about eight of these 
resulting in the death of a child. Based on the figures for 2009/ 10  (cited in 
Munro, 2010a), as there are approximately 35,000  ch ildren formally subject 
to child protection plans, the probability of a child in  this group being killed is 
.025% or 1:4375, which is a very low level of risk. On the other hand, in  
probability terms, this means that 87% of the children killed and seriously 
injured come from what are regarded as much broader a nd low risk 
populations, which are either (i) those who have on ly had some general 
contact with children’s social care services over a period of years, or ( ii) no 
contact at all. As there are between 500,000  and 60 0 ,000  initial referrals to 
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social care each year (see Munro, 2010a), the first  category can potentially 
include millions of families. The potential population for the second category 
is all the children in the country, i.e. 11 million . With such large potential 
populations to try and assess, the issue of detection and prediction becomes 
impossible and can only lead to an excessive number of false positives. 
It is worth noting that, in relation to very young children, those under one 
year old accounted for nearly 50% of the incidents examined by SCRs, 
Brandon et al. (2008) say that ‘the families of very young children who were 
physically assaulted tended to be in  contact with universal services or adult 
services rather than children ’s social care’ (p.7). So for this age group, the 
relevant sample is all children under one year, which is approximately 
640 ,000  (Pritchard and Williams, 2010), rather than  only those known to 
social care services. 
Therefore, as non -accidental child deaths are so rare in statistical terms, for 
any individual social worker there is almost no chance that a child on their 
caseload will die in a non-accidental manner. Equally, as such deaths do 
happen on a very rare but regular basis, then over say a 20  year period, it is 
quite probable that most child care agencies working in the field of child 
protection will experience the non-accidental death of a child within their 
client population.  
Writing about issues of violence risk prediction in  relation to people with 
mental illness, where cases of homicide have a similar high public profile as 
those involving children, Szmukler (2003) identifies the ‘base rate’ problem 
as key in relation to assessing the accuracy of prediction. When the base rate 
is very low in relation to the issue in question, i.e. which people with a mental 
illness might or might not be violent or which parents or carers might or 
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might not be responsible for injuring or killing their child, then predictive risk 
assessment is of very little value.  Drawing on the findings of some of the 
predictive research literature in his field (Buchan an and Leese, 2001; 
Monahan et al., 2001), Szmukler notes that ‘if 5% of the population of interest 
is violent, then the (predictive) test will be wrong 92 times out of a 100’ 
(2003, p.205). In relation to homicides committed by patients with a 
psychosis, he argues that as the rate is approximately 1 in 10 ,000  per annum, 
then ‘prediction is meaningless’ (Szmukler, 2001). As the annual base rate for 
non-accidental deaths of children, as described above, is 20  times less than 
this, in statistical terms any attempt to predict which children may be at risk 
of being killed non-accidentally is an even more meaningless exercise. 
 
Makin g judgm e n ts  un de r un ce rtain ty 
As the issue here is to understand why policymakers, professionals and the 
public perceive that childcare work potentially car ries such a high level of risk 
of child death, what has been described as the 'psychometric paradigm' 
(Wilkinson, 2010) or the behavioural psychology approach to risk, can be of 
considerable use. This approach is based in the original work of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Kahneman et al, 1982) and has been 
developed by Paul Slovic and his collaborators (Slovic, 2000). This work has 
been important is analysing how people perceive and construct risk and so is 
helpful in trying understand why anxiety about a very rare event, the non -
accidental death of a child, has come to dominate interactions between child 
welfare professionals and the cases they work with. The approach 
differentiated itself from much of the previous theoretical thinking about risk 
and decision-making, which was based on the idea of the ‘rational’ human 
12 
being. This was the (ideal) person who worked out logically what was the most 
beneficial course of action or decision in terms of their own per sonal benefit 
or welfare and then acted on that (Bernstein, 1996). What Kahneman and 
Tversky did was to identify patterns of behaviour that limit human beings 
ability to make, what would seem to be, the most rational response in terms of 
their decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman et al., 1982). 
In general terms, the two key factors are firstly, that not surprisingly, natural 
emotional responses can often seriously affect how people make decisions and 
secondly, they suggest that people have difficulty understanding the 
complexity of many situations, in other words they don’t have sufficient 
information (Bernstein, 1996). Using a wide range of empirical experiments, 
Kahneman and Tversky explored how people actually made decisions in  
experimental contexts. For example, faced with a number of choices, people 
are risk averse in one context, but offered the sam e choice in a different 
context; they are willing to accept a risk. Kahneman and Tversky identified an 
asymmetrical pattern between possible gains and losses, or between positive 
and negative outcomes. Bernstein (1996) outlines one imaginary scenario 
used by Kahneman and Tversky to illustrate this difference.  
Imagine that a rare disease is breaking out in some community and is 
expected to kill 600  people. Two different programm es are available 
to deal with the threat. If programme A is adopted, 200  people will be 
saved; if programme B is adopted there is a 33% probability that 
everyone will be saved and a 67% probability that no one will be 
saved....If most of us are risk averse, rational people will prefer Plan 
A's certainty of saving 200  lives over Plan B's gamble, which has the 
same mathematical expectancy but involved taking the risk of a 67% 
chance that everyone will die (p.273). 
 
Not surprisingly, over 70% of those in the experiment took the risk-averse 
option. However, when the same situation was presented in a different 
context, the response to the same basic facts was actually different. In this 
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case, there is a Programme C where 400  out of 600  people will die, while 
Programme D assumes that there is a 33% probability that nobody will die 
and a 67% chance that everyone will die. As Bernstein notes, in this second 
scenario ‘the first of the two choices is now expressed in terms of 400  deaths 
rather than 200  survivors, while the second program me offers a 33% chance 
that no one will die’ (1996, p.273). In this part of the experiment 78% of the 
people involved became risk-seekers and chose Programme D in order to 
avoid the sure outcome of 400  deaths. 
Although in both scenarios the outcome probability is the same, either 200  
people remain alive or there is a 33% chance of everyone surviving, the people 
in the experiment did not respond in what might be considered a logical 
manner by making the same judgment in both instances. Instead, in the first 
scenario they are risk averse and in the other, they are risk-takers. To explain 
this, Tversky says that the "major driving force (for people) is loss aversion" 
(1990, p.75, cited in Bernstein). A loss (400  deaths) was experienced as much 
worse that a positive outcome (200  alive). 
Non-accidental child deaths can be seen as providing a particularly strong 
example of loss-aversion, based on the overwhelming emotional responses of 
both the public and the media to such cases. These very rare events are usually 
judged in retrospect as being predictable and preventable, leading to the 
blaming of specific individuals for the particular deaths. Rationally, as 
discussed earlier, the incidence of non-accidental child deaths has been quite 
consistent (and may actually be reducing) over a period of more than 30  years 
and therefore, another death, while obviously a tragedy, should not be 
unexpected. However, each case that makes it into the public arena is 
regarded with horror, and often brings forward what  might be described as 
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the ‘utopian bias’, i. e. that no child should ever die in a non-accidental 
manner. Risk, in these situations, is then constructed as a m oral issue and any 
child’s non-accidental death can be seen as a failure by professionals, agencies 
and society itself (Heyman et al., 2010). 
This was shown by the comment of the former Children's minister, Ed Balls, 
in relation to the Peter Connolly case when he said: 
The case of Baby P is tragic and appalling. It is our duty to take 
whatever action is needed to ensure that such a tragedy doesn’t 
happen again, that lessons are learned and that children in  Haringey 
are safe.  (Daily Telegraph, 12 th November 2008) 
 
However, as he made the comments some 15 months after the death of Baby 
P, the statistical probability was that another 50  to 70  children had already 
suffered non-accidental deaths over this period. Although Mr. Balls would 
presumably have been aware of the statistical figures, the political context in 
which he was speaking made it, from his point of view, necessary to argue that 
such a case as Baby P should not happen again. Rather than seeing this 
statement as ‘irrational’ in logical terms, Kemshall describes this as a 
‘situated rationality’, which is one that is ‘embedded in place, time and 
network’ (2010, p. 1249), so that the context of the meaning has to be 
considered as well as the logic. While Kahneman and Tversky have been 
criticised for positing that human behaviour is basically ‘irrational’, in fact 
they suggest that ‘the evidence indicates that human choices are orderly, 
although not always rational in the traditional sense of the word’ (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1973, cited in Bernstein, 1996, p.282). 
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So m e  co m m o n  e rro rs  in  pro bability th in kin g 
In their work, Kahneman and Tversky analysed the principles and techniques 
that people use to determine the likelihood of future uncertain events so that 
complex tasks can be reduced to simpler and more useable judgments. They 
called these learning devices heuristics and they can be very useful in 
facilitating decision-making. However, due to a human tendency towards 
certain biases in making judgments, for very valid contextual reasons as 
described above, they can also lead to a range of important errors. Two of the 
main heuristics they described are: representativeness, which is concerned 
with probabilistic questions such as: What is the probability that object A 
belongs to class B? or that A is representat ive of B? and availability , where 
people assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease 
with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind. Both of these 
heuristic devices can aid decision-making in uncertain situations but can also 
lead to a number of biases in thinking, which can then create serious errors. 
(i) Representativeness 
One of the experiments to demonstrate how people use the representativeness 
heuristic to make judgments is known as the 'Linda' question (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1982). In this experiment participants were given a brief pen picture 
of a woman named Linda. She is described as aged 31, single, outspoken and 
very bright. She has a degree in philosophy. As a student, she is deeply 
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also 
participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Participants were then asked to 
rate how likely it was that Linda might be involved in a list of possible 
occupations, which included teacher in a primary school, psychiatric social 
worker, bank teller, active in the feminist movemen t, or bank teller and active 
16 
in the feminist movement. The interesting outcome of this experiment was 
that regardless of how they rated other occupations, 89% placed the likelihood 
that she was a bank teller and active in the feminist movement higher than the 
possibility she was a bank teller alone. However, when looked at in logical 
terms, it has to be at least as likely that Linda is just a bank teller, as it is that 
she is a bank teller and  active in the feminist movement. There is, of course, 
the possibility that she is a bank teller and not active in the feminist 
movement.  The provision of the pen picture had created a representation of a 
kind of person that overruled the logic of what the outcome should be. 
If we examine this heuristic in relation to assessing children and whether they 
are at risk, both Parton (2010) and Munro (2010b) in previous volumes of 
Health, Risk and Society  note that a lot of work has been carried out to 
identify 'risk factors' in relation to possible negative outcomes for children.  In 
other words, what is a representative type of family where child abuse might 
be an issue? Some of the characteristics that have been identified include: 
parental low income and unemployment, poor parenting, poor schooling, 
postnatal depression, low birth rates or living in disadvantaged communities 
(Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 2003). However, th ey also note the 
comments of researchers Fernstein and Sabates that ‘Children move in and 
out of risk in terms of their own development and their levels of contextual 
risk’ (2006, p.35). Therefore, while it is possible to identify factors that 
contribute to the probability of children being at risk (and some of these 
factors are of more general nature than others), an d so create a category of 
children where risk is an issue, this does not help  in identifying those 
particular children in  this category that might actually be at risk. In this 
context, it is possible to have a statistical percentage but not a particular 
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person. As Munro puts it ‘The known risk factors are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for producing adverse outcomes’ (2010b, p. 123). They are not 
sufficiently representative to allow accurate prediction of potential risk.  
In these circumstances, a social worker faced with a new initial referral, of 
which there are 600 ,000  a year, where some of poten tial risk factors are 
present, has to decide how risky a particular case might be and that is a 
judgment made under conditions of uncertainty. There are a variety of 
possible outcome in terms of a decision. The social worker might decide there 
should be no further action, or an initial assessment needs to be made, or a 
more in-depth assessment or to move towards a child protect ion plan. 
However, the decision has to be made in relation to each specific case without 
knowing in advance what category of case each one might represent. Munro in 
her Review  of Child Protection: Part One (2010a) gives the retrospective 
figures for all the decisions made in relation to the 600 ,000  referrals in the 
previous year. These were: 
• No concerns (so no further action is taken) - 200 ,000  or 33% of the 
total referrals 
• Needs an initial assessm ent - 400 ,000  or 65% of the referrals 
• Needs a m ore in depth assessm ent - 140 ,00  or 25% of referrals 
• At risk of significant harm  - 35,000  or 6% of referrals 
The final category is the one described earlier in this paper: 
• May be killed non-accidentally  – up to 55 or 0 .01% of referrals.                              
Drawing on the figures above, in probability terms, therefore, the initial 
referral is most likely t0  be a child where no furt her action is needed or a child 
in need (approximately 94% of total referrals), rat her than a child protection 
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case (6% of total referrals), yet many social workers feel great anxiety that 
each and any particular case might be extremely risky for them. 
If we think about this in terms of child care assessments, any particular child 
is far more likely to be a child in need of support  rather than a 'child at risk' 
case and therefore it makes sense for social worker s to approach cases in a 
positive and supportive manner. However, the childcare system is constructed 
on the bias that any case might be both  a child in need and a child that is at 
risk of significant harm  and therefore risk is the dominant concern. In other 
words, ‘risk’ and not ‘need’ has become the basis for assessment (Kemshall, 
2002). 
The sense of what an individual childcare case might represent has been 
distorted more recently by policy documents and reports into childcare an d 
child protection that have argued that, to some extent, all children can 
potentially be seen as children needing support. For example, the Laming 
Report argued that even if the Victoria Climbie case was not seen as a ‘formal’ 
child at risk, she should have been seen as a ‘child in need’ and so potentially  
a ‘child at risk’ (Laming, 2003).  This has the effect of creating a logically 
incoherent category of children who are ‘at risk of being at risk’ that is not 
based on a probabilistic prediction derived from in formation on existing 
examples of children, but on an unquantifiable imagining of what might 
happen in the future. From this perspective, all cases of ‘children in need’ 
should be looked at as closely as cases of ‘children at risk’ and equally, that all 
cases of child protection should be seen as children in need. The blurring of 
the line between children in need and children at r isk was taken up by the 
consultative Green Paper Every  Child Matters (Chief Secretary to the 
19 
Treasury, 2003), which was the government’s response to the Laming Report. 
It was not just about child abuse but as Parton says: 
It was to include all children  as it was felt that any child, at some point 
in their life, could be seen as vulnerable to some form of risk and 
therefore might require help ’  (2010, p.54, original emphasis).  
 
This form of thinking in relation to possible future negative events has been 
described as a ‘precautionary approach to risk’ (Alaszewski and Burgess, 
2007, p.355). It is more concerned with a fear about  what might happen in the 
future, rather than learning from the past. Therefore there is a general fear in 
relation to all children about the future and the worst-case scenario would be 
a non-accidental death. 
This trend has continued with the publication of the Final Report of The 
Munro Review  of Child Protection (Munro, 2011), which although its title 
focuses on child protection, the report addresses issues affecting all children, 
including early intervention and the role of universal child welfare services. As 
Munro herself says ‘...a central question (for the report) was “what helps 
professionals make the best judgments they can to protect a vulnerable 
child?”’ (2011, p.6). The issue of ‘protection’ is again the dominant one. In a 
discussion of policy developments over the last 20  years Parton makes the 
point that: 
While the focus for both assessment and possible intervention has 
thus considerably broadened between 1991 and 2006, the forensic 
investigation of child m altreatm ent still inhabits the core of the 
system ’ (2010, p.53) (emphasis added). 
 
Therefore all children coming in contact with the childcare system are to be 
considered as potentially (or as a representative of) children at risk. 
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(ii) Availability  
The availability heuristic means that people assess the probability of an event 
by drawing on instances and occurrences that are easily brought to mind.  For 
example, people regularly over-estimate the number of murders that take 
place and under-estimate the number of people who die from particular  
natural causes as (understandably) murders often receive extensive publicity 
and so are easily recalled when one occurs, whereas deaths from a natural 
causes usually only impact on people if it is someone close to them (Tversky & 
Koehler, 1994). This availability heuristic is affected by a number of biases in 
human thought processes, such as the ease with which it is possible to 
mentally search for examples. When asked to consider which occurred more 
frequently, words ending in the letter ‘g’ or words ending in ‘ing’, most people 
answered that words ending in ‘ing’ were more common. However, in reality 
the opposite is true as clearly all words ending in  ‘ing’ include the letter ‘g’. 
But people responded as they did because words ending in ‘ing’ are more 
available, i.e. easier to bring to mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Therefore, if people are asked to think of examples of social work practice, it is 
understandable that the extensive coverage of the limited number of child 
deaths will dominate their responses, rather than any other stories of good 
practice. 
As non-accidental deaths of children are very high visibility events in the 
media, people often have high profile incidents fixed in their mind. The names 
of children who have been the focus of child death inquiries in recent years 
have become iconic, e.g. Victoria Climbie, and most recently, 'Baby P'. In fact 
the phrase ‘Baby P’ now serves the function of a signifier for the general 
public to stand for all and any examples of non-accidental child deaths and 
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the failure of welfare services, even if many of these people would have very 
little idea of what his actual name was or the specific circumstances of the 
case. Kitzinger (2000) suggests that cases such as Baby P become media 
‘templates’, which are key events that extend beyond there own lifespan and 
are then used to explain current events, but in a restrictive and controlled way. 
From this perspective, because the Baby P case is now so ‘available’ as an 
example in the public mind, it is a template that constrains discussion of other 
more recent cases of child deaths, as well as child protection in general. Each 
new case is compared to that of Baby P. 
While Kahneman and Tversky’s view is that the heuristics described above 
can distort people’s ability to understand the actual statistical level of risk in  
different contexts, Heyman et al. (2010) argue that, in fact, inductive 
probabilistic reasoning (statistical probability) is in itself a ‘heuristic’ as it 
relies on the past as a guide to future possibilities and uses statistics to 
categorise individuals – it is in itself a ‘rule of thumb’ (p. 86). So when figures 
are given for the numbers of children identified as either being ‘in need’ or ‘at 
risk’ these are themselves constructed categories that children can move in 
and out of over time. Therefore they suggest that the way ordinary people 
think about risk and the shortcuts they use to make decisions, such as 
‘representativeness’ and ‘availability’, can best be described as ‘heuristics 
about heuristics’ (Heyman et al., p. 97). What this means is that people are 
using simplifications to understand what are already generalisations, and 
while this can be very useful in many situations, it can also lead to erroneous 
decisions.  
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Pre dictin g the  Pas t 
One of the ways that the heuristics and biases in probability thinking 
described above affect people’s understanding of the risk of non-accidental 
child deaths is that they are re-constructed and re-confirmed on a regular 
basis by inquiry reports into particular cases. Oft en these individual reports 
then receive extensive coverage in the media, which creates great pressure for 
political action.  In these cases, the reports’ analyses of the past then become 
predictors of the future in order to identify possible children, who may be at 
risk of ‘significant harm’. Therefore, one of the effects of the inquiries in to 
non-accidental child deaths has been to operate a 'hindsight bias', which 
claims that at certain points in time in the past during their involvement with 
the child, not only should the professionals involved have done X, but also 
that they should have known at that point in time that X was the right thing to 
do. In other words the inquiry report writers are ' predicting the past' 
(Frischoff, 1982). They are saying that there was only one logical course of 
action for the professionals to take. Instead of having to make judgments 
under conditions of uncertainty the report writers,  as a result of knowing the 
outcome, claim that the professionals involved at the time should have 
foreseen the probability of a negative event in the future. Clearly, as reports 
are only written after the death of a child, the ou tcome is known and such an 
approach inevitably engenders a focus on failure and an exploration of how 
something went wrong (and who is to blame). As Frischoff (1982) says, a focus 
on failure is likely to mislead us by creating a distorted view of the prevalence 
of misfortune.  
In looking back at incidents in cases involving child deaths, inquiry reports 
often identify moments when they say professionals should have acted 
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differently (the implication being that if they had done the 'right' thing, the 
child would not have died). For example, in  relation to the Climbie case, the 
Laming report said that there were 12 occasions when the child could have 
been saved (Laming, 2003). By commenting like this the writers are saying 
that the actual outcome (the death of a child) could have been predicted at 
these moments and therefore it should have been obvious to the professionals 
involved of the need to intervene and stop this happening. The writers of the 
inquiry reports, by going into every action carried  out by professionals 
involved in the case, and at the same time knowing the eventual result of the 
case, create a single narrative, which gains credibility from the sheer amount 
of detail involved and makes the final outcome appear to be inevitable.  
The Laming Report is a particularly detailed example of this. Cooper (2005), 
in a discussion of what he describes as ‘emotional issues’ in child protection, 
comments on the report saying there is a ‘kind of restrained passion 
informing the opening pages of the first chapter of the report’ (p.5) and that 
Laming seemed to be driven by a strong personal response to what happened 
to the child. Cooper also notes the ‘meticulously reconstructed narratives’ that 
are present in the document. What he is noticing here is how the past is being 
recreated in the present, driven by an emotional in tensity because it is based 
in knowledge of the outcome. As Taleb (2007) says 'When you look at the past, 
the past will always be deterministic since only one single observation took 
place’ (p.56). 
However, this is creating a context in the past, which is dominated by the idea 
that the child might die and which proposes that the professionals were 
thinking to themselves 'how I act in this moment might affect whether this 
child lives or dies'. Clearly, there are very few p rofessionals who would be able 
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to live and work that way, and it is very unlikely that they would have seen the 
particular moment (home visit, telephone call, meeting) in such life and death 
terms. It is much more likely that the event was one of 20  or 30  such moments 
in a week's work, which might have involved half a dozen different families all 
with a relatively similar profile to the one in question. To think about the past 
usefully, one must try and understand what the actual context for the 
particular professional was at that moment in  time when the family and child 
in question were, in reality, another case on a caseload and not a very rare 
tragedy. As Fischoff says, "...if one is interested in learning from the 
experience of others, it is important to determine what problem they were 
attempting to solve" (1982, p.340). 
This bias towards privileging hindsight has been described as 'creeping 
determinism', which is the tendency to view reported outcomes as having 
been relatively inevitable (Frischoff, 1982) and to think that the people 
involved should have had some awareness of the unfolding historical situation 
as it was happening. Fischhoff suggests that, if people had this ability, then it 
would be possible for them to write in their diary 'Dear Diary, The Hundred 
Years War started today' (1970 cited in 1982). 
Fischoff argues however, that trying to predict the past can in fact harm our 
ability to judge it or learn from it: 
 ...in the short run, failure to ignore outcome knowledge holds 
substantial benefits. It is quite flattering to believe that we would have 
known all along what we could only know with outcome knowledge, 
that is, that we possess hindsightful foresight' (1982, p.342). 
 
In a sense, this is the dilemma that the inquiry reports have created for 
professionals, requiring them  to have 'hindsightful foresight', and so to act in 
their present, bearing in mind how others in the future might judge these 
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actions. This must inevitably lead to a more risk averse and defensive mode of 
practice. A very striking example of this was the sizeable increase in the 
number of children referred to social workers after  the publicity in relation to 
the Baby P case (55,000  extra referrals in 2009/ 10 , which was an increase of 
11% on 2008/ 09 (Munro, 2010a)). It is reasonable to assume that this 
increase was due to the fact that social workers in their day-to-day work were 
behaving in a precautionary manner and attempting to predict how potential 
inquiries in the future might judge their decision -making. 
 
Discuss io n  
As described above, a single, unique event in  the past, a child death, is turned 
by inquiry reports into criteria for constructing categories of children 
potentially at risk in the future. With the focus of child welfare now on early 
intervention and to take action before any harm or restrictions of 
development have occurred (Parton, 2010), this means categorising children 
(and families) at an early stage using criteria based on previous research (see 
Farringdon 1996). However, such an approach only allows probabilistic 
analysis of categories of children and potential outcomes. It cannot identify 
individual cases and predict specific outcomes. Prior to the death of Peter 
Connolly (Baby P), the child was one of approximately 35,000  children who 
were regarded as formally 'at risk'. At that point  in time, many potential 
outcomes were possible for all or any of these children, of which the worst and 
least probable, was non-accidental death. After the event of his death, Peter 
Connolly became one of the approximately 55 children who died from non-
accidental causes in that year. However, at least 34, 945 of the other children 
in that category did not die and their cases had different outcomes.  
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Szmukler (2000) in an analysis of homicide inquiries where a person has been 
killed by someone diagnosed as mentally ill, points out, rightly, that the death 
of an adult (or child) is the worst possible outcome case for the professionals 
involved and the organisation. He raises the question that, even if failures 
were identified in the work of the professionals involved, whether it is right 
they should be judged solely on their worst ever case. He also argues that if it 
is claimed that homicides (or child deaths) are preventable by a service then 
the fact they are so rare means that overall the service must be doing a very 
good job (p. 9). However, this is not the picture often presented by inquiry 
reports into mental illness related homicides or ch ild deaths. In many cases 
the specific event is used as a basis for criticising not only the organisations 
involved, but also the management systems. As with non-accidental child 
deaths, Smukler (2000) argues quite strongly that ‘An assumption 
reigns......that all such homicides are preventable, despite the fact that every 
country has, and has always had them. For some reason, ours has become 
terrorised by them ’ (2000, p. 6).  In terms of child protection work it  is also 
true that child deaths occur in every country (see Pritchard and Williams, 
2010) and while social workers in the UK may not quite feel terrorised, it is 
clear many do experience great anxiety and stress in relation to their work, as 
shown by the high turn over and high vacancy rates in child protection posts 
(communitycare.org.uk, 2009; basw.co.uk, 2012). 
Statistical analysis of the numbers of non-accidental child deaths 
demonstrates that they have been and continue to be very rare events and the 
probability of such an event affecting a particular  child or particular social 
worker is so slight as to be statistically insignificant. Therefore, it makes no 
sense in probability terms that such a minimal risk should be one of the key 
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components of the childcare system. As Munro (2010a) has shown, lowering 
or raising the ‘threshold’ for formal social work intervention with children 
and families merely increases or  decreases the number of cases of false 
positives that become involved with the system. However, the regular 
inquiries over the years into non -accidental child deaths and the current 
system of Serious Case Reviews has distorted the perception of the frequency 
and predictability of such events. The tendency to generalise from single 
negative instances encourages the heuristics and biases in the media, 
policymakers’ and public’s understanding of risk described above. As 
Devaney et al. (2010, p. 243) point out, when there is a non-accidental child 
death: 
..this leads to the 'unholy trinity' of media pillorying, detailed post-
mortem recommendations about the operation of the system on the 
heels of inquiries and the increasing prescription of practice, 
resulting in social workers and other child welfare professionals 
becoming focused on the need to avoid a non-accidental death that is 
the “classic instance of a low probability/ high consequence risk that 
leads to risk-averse cultures and practices in all walks of life”  
(Cooper et al., 2003, pp. 10 -11).’ 
 
While the biennial overview reports of serious case reviews have been useful in 
providing some analysis of the features of child deaths and serious injury from 
abuse and neglect, their main findings illustrate the unpredictability of such 
events. The very low base rate of incidents in relation to the overall child 
population means that factors identified as relevant across the serious case 
review reports, such as mental illness, violence, neglect, etc., can have no 
useful predictive value in relation to wider categories of children, as such 
factors exist in many families. The consistently low percentage of cases that 
were formally considered ‘at risk’ at the time of the incident and the fact that 
almost 50% of the cases involved children under one year old, demonstrate 
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that the population of children dealt with by child care social workers are the 
least likely to be affected.  While individual serious case reviews may produce 
some useful information for the local agencies involved, the government 
requirement for them to be carried out in every case and to be made public 
gives far more emphasis to individual review findings than can be justified. As 
each deals with a specific case in a specific context, the general applicability of 
any findings is very limited. A recent survey of 20  serious case reviews 
identified that they had produced a total of 932 recommendations, giving an 
average of 47  recommendations per review (Brandon et al. 2012). If this figure 
were extrapolated to cover the 800  reviews analysed  since 2003, it would give 
an eye-watering potential total of over 37,500  recommendat ions. Clearly, there 
is nothing more to recommend that might make the very rare incidents of child 
deaths more predictable or preventable. As Macdonald and Macdonald (2010) 
argue, by focusing a greatly disproportionate amoun t of energy and effort on 
such low probability outcomes, attention is diverted away from the good that 
social work can do for the broad population of vulnerable people. 
 
Co n clus io n  
This paper has argued that the possibility of a child dying dominates both 
policymaking and frontline practice of child welfare services when, in fact, the 
statistical probability of non-accidental child deaths can be calculated very 
well and they are very rare events. However, the recurrent  inquiry reports, by 
focusing on individual and specific children and reconstructing and 
‘predicting’ the past, fuel both the ‘hindsight bias’ that the death should and 
could have been prevented and the myth of ‘total’ prevention (the ‘utopian 
bias’), that no child should die non-accidentally in the future.  
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Frank Knight, an economist and one of the early writers on risk and 
uncertainty said: 
Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically dist inct from the 
familiar notion of Risk, from which is has never been properly 
separated.....It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ 
proper...is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in 
effect an uncertainty at all (Knight, 1921, p.205 in Bernstein, 1998, 
p.219). 
 
The child welfare system is conflating together the risk (measurable 
uncertainty) of a certain number of children dying within the overall child 
population, which is quite predictable; and unmeasurable uncertainty, which 
tries to identify the specific child that might die in one specific local authority, 
which is not. So instead of seeing child deaths as extremely rare and part of 
the human condition (Szmukler, 2000) with no probability that the vast 
majority of social workers will experience such a death on their caseload in 
their working life, the possibility of such an event remains part of every 
childcare social worker’s consciousness. By having child protection ‘inhabit 
the core of the (child welfare) system’ and child deaths inhabit the core of 
child protection, unmeasurable uncertainty becomes its dominant feature.  
On the other hand, by taking on board the probability that .0005 percent of 
children may die non-accidentally each year, and that these deaths are the 
result of such a complex array of factors they are neither pr edictable or 
preventable, social work could focus more directly on the hundreds of 
thousands of children and families that come in contact with it looking for 
help and support.   
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